Intertemporal movie distribution: Versioning when customers can buy both versions* We study a model of film production, distribution and consumption. The studio can release two goods, a theatrical and a video version, and has to decide on its versioning and sequencing strategy. In contrast with the previous literature, we allow for the possibility that consumers watch both versions. This simple extension leads to novel results. It now becomes optimal to introduce versioning if the goods are not too substitutes for one another, even when production costs are zero (pure information goods). We also demonstrate that a 'day-and-date' strategy can be optimal when the studio is integrated with the exhibition and distribution channels. In contrast, a 'video window' is typically the outcome of the negotiation between the studio and independent distributors and exhibitors.
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=145352
Introduction
This paper examines the sale of movies through sequential distribution channels. Many products such as movies, books, and video games are introduced sequentially through di¤erent channels. First, they are o¤ered in specialized stores with selected audiences and afterwards they are made widely available through chain stores. Firms use this strategy to segment consumers reluctant to buy from the …rst channel and to stimulate consumers to buy the product repeatedly (Lehmann and Weinberg, 2000) .
In the movie industry, producers' revenues are crucially determined by the number of versions being o¤ered and by the timing of their release. Movies are typically …rst shown in a theatre, followed later by their video version. This responds to the principle of the "second-best alternative", according to which the producer should initially o¤er the movie in the channel that generates the highest revenue in the least amount of time. Then, the movie should cascade down to markets with lower returns per unit of time. Historically, this has resulted in theatrical screening, followed by pay-TV programming, home video, network television, and …nally local television syndication (Owen and Wildman, 1992; Eliashberg et al., 2006; Vogel, 2007) . All these various channels have distinct features that might a¤ect the success of the movie (Henning-Thurau et al., 2006). Theatre box o¢ ce and home video represent the two major sources of revenues, with home video consistently at the top since the early 90s (Waterman, 2005 ).
An essential aspect in the sequencing strategy of a movie is the lapse of time between its initial release in theatres and its debut on video, which is called "video window". In the last decade, the inter-release time has decreased gradually from the 6 months that were the norm for many years to approximately 3 or 4 months (Vogel, 2007; Frank, 1999; Nelson et al. 2007 ). While part of this change can be attributed to advances in the home video market, there is also evidence of frictions between distribution channels, in particular between producers and exhibitors. For example, Disney decided in 2010 to accelerate the release of DVD and Blu-ray Disc versions of "Alice in Wonderland", a 3D motion picture directed by Tim Burton, shortly after its theatrical screening -both in the U.S. and in Europe. 1 In the U.K., the big exhibitors …rst reacted by refusing to book any movie that would not have a guaranteed 4-month run, but later had to concede and allowed Disney to cut the gap between the theatrical opening and the DVD release to 12 weeks. 2 The understanding of these changes is the main motivation of our research. We analyze how producers like Disney commercialize their movies through separate distribution channels. In particular, we examine how producers negotiate the release sequence of the theatrical and video versions with independent exhibitors and distributors who might 1 Hollywood Reporter (Los Angeles): "Bob Iger wasn't blu¢ ng. The Disney CEO has been telling Wall Street for months of his plans for studio executives to shorten traditional movie release schedules. The time has arrived for the …rst grand experiment." http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100210/…lm_nm/us_alice 2 The literature on versioning has shown that when a …rm introduces a new version this expands the market, but also cannibalizes the existing versions, as some consumers switch to the new alternative. The seminal works of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy (1984) show that versioning is optimal, while Stokey (1979) provides conditions under which it is not the best strategy. Salant (1989) reconciles these studies by showing that their di¤erences stem from the marginal cost function. In fact, in the model speci…cations of Mussa and Rosen (1978) versioning is optimal if the marginal cost function of improving quality is su¢ ciently convex. By contrast, in the case of information goods, where the variable reproduction costs are constant or even zero, versioning is not pro…table and only the high-quality good should be supplied. A number of recent studies in the marketing and management literature have generalized this analysis. 3 Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) show that versioning is pro…table when the optimal market share of the lower quality version, o¤ered alone, is greater than the optimal market share of the high quality version, o¤ered alone. Anderson and Dana (2009) …nd that an "increased percentage di¤erences" condition is needed for versioning to be optimal, that is, the percentage change in total joint surplus (between the consumers and the …rm) associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers'willingness to pay. The literature has also tackled the fundamental question of whether to introduce the di¤erent versions simultaneously or sequentially. Moorthy and Png (1992) use the framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978) to analyze the optimal introduction of a product for a monopoly seller. They demonstrate that the sequential introduction of the variants, whereby the monopoly …rst serves the consumers with high preferences and afterwards the consumers with lower preferences, might be pro…table when consumers are relatively more impatient than the seller (i.e., they have a higher time discount rate). They employ a model with increasing marginal costs of production, which arguably does not …t information goods very well. 4 Padmanabhan et al. (1997) analyze the monopolist's distribution strategy when consumers are uncertain about the presence of demand externalities. They show that the …rm can o¤er a credible signal of high externalities by …rst introducing a product with less than full quality and afterwards an upgrade. For example, a part of a software product can be given away for free to signal the attractiveness of the commercially sold version. Why, then, another paper on versioning? All the works mentioned above assume that consumers buy at most one version of a good, e.g., one cup of co¤ee, or one model of car. 5 However, this assumption does not really suit the movie industry, where some consumers 3 For a comprehensive review of the literature on product development, see Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) . 4 Riggins (2004) extends this model to consider that a seller markets its products in an online (Internet) channel and an o-ine (bricks-and-mortar) store. He shows that low-type consumers are served only in the o-ine market, when there are not enough consumers to o¤er a low-quality good online. Wildman (2008) and Zhang (2009) also consider distribution through the Internet and traditional channels. 5 An exception is Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003) who however study a duopoly model of competition and are less interested in the core questions of versioning and sequencing we focus on here.
2 watch both versions, especially those with a high willingness to pay. While empirical studies have demonstrated that individual consumers might watch the same movie more than once in di¤erent channels, 6 scant attention has been paid to develop theoretical models that explain how this a¤ects the versioning and sequencing decisions of …rms. Our …rst contribution to the marketing literature is to extend the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy and Png (1992) to analyze a simple problem of versioning, where an integrated monopolist sells two variants of a product to a continuum of consumers who can potentially consume both versions. We address a novel problem by considering versioning (the manufacturer's role) and the ability for a consumer to buy multiple items (the consumer's role). This simple innovation has important managerial implications. We show that, if the single unit purchase assumption is imposed, the …rm never o¤ers the two versions. In contrast, when consumers are allowed to buy both versions, versioning becomes optimal, with some consumers buying the high-quality good, some buying the low-quality good, and some consumers buying both. The degree of substitutability between versions is essential for this conclusion to hold, because if the two versions are too substitutes for one another, one version cannibalizes the other and our model boils down to the standard result for pure information goods where versioning is not pro…table.
We then analyze when the manufacturer should use sequencing. We show that, when the seller and the consumer have the same discount factor, the monopolist will never introduce the two versions sequentially. Both versions are always sold at the earliest possible date when versioning is optimal, because delaying the release of one version would only discount pro…ts into the future. However, when the consumers'time discount factor is lower than the seller's, sequencing emerges for pure information goods as long as the versions are imperfect substitutes. This result is in stark contrast to Moorthy and Png (1992) , who analyze the case with a convex cost function. We also show that the video window is longer when the …rm is unable to commit to the future price of the video version. When versions are imperfect substitutes, the …rm has an incentive to delay the introduction of the low quality version as a mechanism to endogeneously di¤erentiate the products, and this incentive is stronger when it lacks the ability to commit ex ante to a su¢ ciently high price for this version.
Since versions have to be distributed to consumers, the second contribution our paper is to probe the relevance of having separate distribution channels (the channel's role). We show that the versioning and sequencing strategies vary substantially when there is vertical separation between the producer of a movie and the distribution channels. In the movie industry, producers and video distributors might bene…t from a quicker video release because potential consumers are still in ‡uenced by the publicity from the theatrical release and because this moves their video revenues ahead. However, theatre exhibitors might be worried that, if the video window is too short, consumers will wait for the video version. While some papers like Gil (2007 and ), Corts (2001) and Mortimer (2007) take into account the vertical separation between the producer and the channels, to our knowledge this is the …rst work that considers the interaction among the roles of producers, consumers, and channels.
Our model considers that the producer, as copyright holder, designs the whole commercialization strategy of movies. However, it must conduct two separate wholesale bargains, …rst with the exhibitor to determine a rental price for the movie and then with the video distributor to set a revenue sharing agreement for the video. The channels are strategic players, as the retail prices of the two versions are set independently by each channel. We show that both versioning and sequencing can appear, even when the two versions are perfect substitutes. Incentives are misaligned as vertical separation prevents the producer from fully internalizing the pro…ts by selling just one version. Interestingly, our …ndings are supported by recent empirical analysis that shows that majors in the U.S. have longer video windows than independent integrated producers, who prefer a quicker introduction of videos (Waterman and Lee, 2010). A further …nding of our model, con…rmed by the empirical literature, is that the present shrinking of the video window is related both to the distribution of bargaining power of the producer vis-à-vis the various channels, and to the perceived convergence in quality o¤ered by theatrical and video versions.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents relevant stylized facts about the movie industry. Section 3 analyzes the optimal versioning and sequencing strategies of an integrated monopolist. Section 4 re-assesses the main results when the two versions are sold in a vertically-separated chain. Section 5 concludes and o¤ers directions for future research.
The movie industry
It is customary to divide the movie industry into three vertically-related sectors: production, distribution, and exhibition. In the U.S., production and distribution are often performed by the same studios, which we simply call "producers"in our model. Hollywood's major studios (Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, MGM, Fox Film Corporation, Columbia Pictures, Disney, and Warner Brothers) account for 80 to 90% of the total income from the sale of movies to theatres and other media in the United States (Waterman, 2005) . "Exhibitors", by contrast, run theatres and screen movies to attract audiences.
The vertical structure of the movie industry has undergone several changes over the last century. In the 1920s and 1930s major studios owned chains of theatres and formed cartels with other theatre owners to assign the stage run and run length intervals and to set minimum prices and geographic and temporal clearances to theatres in urban areas (Orbach, 2004) . In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount considered that these agreements were in violation of the Sherman Act and required the majors to divest themselves of their theatre chains. The Court prevented majors from setting admission prices and exclusivity contracts with exhibitors. These theatre-owning restrictions were partially relaxed in the 1980s and some majors acquired large theatre chains.
Producers and exhibitors typically agree to share a percentage of the theatre box-o¢ ce receipts (De Vany, 2004) . 7 In spite of this, their interests are not perfectly aligned, as contracts are incomplete and give rise to tensions. Vogel (2007) , McKenzie (2008) , and Gil and Hartmann (2009) argue that, while producers get a percentage of the revenues generated by theatrical versions, exhibitors have incentives to keep the admission prices low in order to raise their popcorn and other concession prices. This situation creates a constant struggle between producers and exhibitors over admission prices, with producers wanting higher admission prices than theatres. In a similar spirit, Gil (2009) argues that the vertical separation of producers and exhibitors causes misaligned incentives when choosing the optimal movie run length, and con…rms this hypothesis using Spanish data. What is relevant for the purpose of this paper is that producers have less than perfect control over exhibitors. Exhibitors enjoy some market power because they may be the only theatre in town, because the movies they show are licensed exclusively to them in their geographic area, or because they in ‡uence how many weeks the movie will be on screen. As a result, two mark-ups appear in the vertical chain, the …rst imposed by producers on the rental price paid by exhibitors, and the second set by exhibitors in the admission price because of their monopolistic condition. Producers cannot avoid this with resale price maintenance or with vertical integration, given the strict anti-trust provisions. It is not coincidental that the seminal paper of Spengler (1950) on the double marginalization distortion was inspired by the 1948 Paramount case. Another important channel for producers is the home video, which is sold by "distributors" in our model. In the last decade, this market has experienced extraordinary growth with the introduction of DVDs, and today video rentals and DVD sales are the largest source of domestic revenue for studios. Mortimer (2007) and Ho et al. (2008) analyze di¤erent pricing mechanisms used by producers in their contracts with video stores. They show that Blockbuster Video adopted sophisticated revenue sharing agreements with several studios already in 1998, and other retailers were quick to adopt the same instrument. In our model, we analyze the case where producers and video distributors negotiate revenue sharing agreements, and we compare this with the alternative case where producers can sell directly the video version to the consumers. Both cases are empirically relevant as there are examples where the distributor is totally independent from the producer (e.g., Blockbuster or Net ‡ix), as well 7 Theatres pay the distributor a fee per week and keep a "house nut" (approximately the exhibitor's weekly cost of operating the theatre). Contracts include a sliding scale for sharing box o¢ ce receipts that exceed the house nut: typically a box-o¢ ce percentage of 70-90% in the …rst two weeks, and thereafter distributors' shares decreases to 60%. Swami et al. (1999) argue that this arrangement creates management problems for exhibitors. Producers have a strong incentive to promote the movies intensely only during the …rst weeks. They propose a programming model to help exhibitors both select and schedule movies in their theatres. Raut et al. (2009) also consider the complexity of these contracts. Despite including a broad range of factors in the optimization problem, possible cannibalization from video releases is not considered.
as cases where the producer sells directly the version via Internet streaming or specialized stores (e.g., Disney or Warner stores).
A …nal but key feature of the movie industry is the video window, the time lag between the theatrical and the video release of a movie. As explained in the introduction, the recent shrinking trend in the video window might re ‡ect the tension existing between producers and channels, and "Alice" is just one example of this con ‡ict. 8 For many years the industry has discussed about the possibility of simultaneously releasing the theatrical and video versions, and a series of experiments have been carried out in this direction. 9 Some studios even contemplate "day-and-date" strategies, meaning that a title is released across two or more channels on the same day. For instance, the movie "Bubble" directed by Steven Soderbergh was released simultaneously across all channels already back in 2006 by 2929 Entertainment, a company that is vertically-integrated across production, distribution, and exhibition. Several authors have empirically analyzed the factors a¤ecting the video window. Frank (1999) and Lehmann and Weinberg (2000) show that large windows reduce the cannibalization of the …rst version, and theatrical marketing and word-of-mouth e¤ects from cinema are used to increase video sales. Luan and Sudhir (2007) consider a model where consumers form expectations about the extent of the video window, and hence they adjust their behavior when producers shorten inter-release times. Hennig-Thurau et al. (2007) analyze the optimal determination of windows in a market with three or more channels to exhibit movies. They also consider how order changes will a¤ect studio revenues and account for regional di¤erences. August and Shin (2010) study sequencing release of movies when going early to the theatre can generate negative congestion externalities.
Most of these studies typically consider models with only two periods, and analyze whether to introduce another version of the movie in the …rst or in the second period. These two periods are pre-determined (an exception is Prasad et al., 2004) . In contrast, we endogenize optimal sequencing in order to examine when to introduce a new variant. Another common feature of these studies is that they do not consider the separation of the industry between production, exhibition and distribution. Our paper shows that accounting for both the manufacturers'and the distributors'roles crucially modi…es the release strategy of movies.
The basic model
We consider a single …rm that o¤ers two versions of a product, a high-quality version denoted as H and a low-quality version denoted as L. Our departure from the extant literature is that we allow consumers to buy both versions. Thus consumers can buy one unit of H alone, or one unit of L alone, or one unit of both versions (we refer to this case as B, a mnemonic for 'both'), or they can also decide to buy nothing (we denote this case by 0). In our application to the movie industry, the …rm is an integrated producer, H represents watching a movie in a theatre, and L represents renting a DVD for watching it at home. 10 Let u i denote the quality of product i = fH; L; B; 0g, where u 0 = 0. When both H and L are bought, the resulting quality of both versions consumed jointly is
where s represents the level of substitutability of the products. The versions are partial substitutes for 0 s < 1. Products H and B are perfect substitutes for s = 1 and versions H and L are independent for s = 0. Notice that s = 1 corresponds to the standard case in the literature, where consumer are limited to a single-unit purchase of either version. In fact, in this case, if a consumer has already bought H, buying L confers no additional utility on top, and therefore she never buys the two versions. The more interesting case is when 0 < s < 1, as it represents the situation where consumers are willing to watch a movie at home that they have already watched in a theater, though the additional bene…t they enjoy is not as high as if they were watching the movie at home for the very …rst time.
There is a continuum of consumers who are heterogeneous in their preferences over quality. Each consumer is represented by her type , which is uniformly distributed over the segment [0; 1]. Following Mussa and Rosen (1978) , the net surplus of a consumer that buys a product of quality u i at price p i is given by u i p i :
The quality of the two versions is taken as given and we denote by k = u H =u L > 1 the quality ratio. In order to concentrate on the more interesting case of pure information goods that can be o¤ered in di¤erent versions, we posit that, once quality is determined and its associated developing costs have been sunk, the …rm has constant marginal costs of supplying each variety of the product, which we normalize to zero. This assumption simpli…es expressions and is useful for our objective of analyzing price discrimination and versioning since it implies that di¤erences in prices are due only to di¤erences in willingness to pay. 1 0 In the movie industry, the utility derived from the theatrical version is allegedly higher than the one obtained from the video version. As an example, in March 2010 Twentieth Century Fox announced the release on regular DVD and Blu-ray, but not in 3-D home video, of "Avatar", the movie directed by James Cameron. See "Avatar out on DVD April 22, but not in 3-D ", http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35895913/ns/entertainmentmovies. It is worth noting that a feature of videos, which is not considered here explicitly, is that they can be viewed several times and by several people (Varian, 2000) . In this case, there is a di¤erence between the one-time experience of a movie, and the stream experience of a DVD. To account for this, the model can be reformulated in terms of having comparable units, so that the DVD streams are aggregated to generate a single overall stock, and the video price would realistically re ‡ect the average price per viewer. 1 1 It is possible to add an initial stage in our basic model to consider the possibility where the …rm sets the product qualities u H , u L as well as the substitutability level s. If the cost of production of the versions increases with the level of di¤erentiation, the …rm will typically sell two versions and will release them with a strictly positive substitutability level. This occurs because although a further di¤erentiation of the channels increases revenues in the last stage of the game, this does not compensate for the increase in the production costs of the versions. Results are available from the authors.
Simultaneous release of the two versions
We start with a single-period analysis where we study the monopolist's incentives to release both versions simultaneously. The second part of this section considers the possibility of releasing the two versions sequentially.
When the two versions are released simultaneously, the net pay-o¤ V of a type-consumer, can be summarized as follows, where i = fH; L; B; 0g denotes the set of choices available to each consumer:
The two products are sold separately. This is the more interesting and realistic case for the movie industry, and is especially convenient for our analysis in Section 4 where the versions are sold sequentially and separately by exhibitors and video distributors. 12 We can now illustrate how the market is split, taking into account that consumers make incentive-compatible decisions. De…ne ij as the consumer that is indi¤erent between buying good i and j, where j 6 = i, at a price
is the consumer that is indi¤erent between buying the high quality version and both versions, and i0 = p i =u i is the consumer that is indi¤erent between buying product i = H; L; B alone, and not buying anything. Di¤erent market shares for the two products can arise according to the relative magnitude of the various indi¤erent consumers ij .
The timing of the game is the following: the …rm decides how many versions to release and sets the prices p L and p H to maximize its pro…ts, anticipating that consumers will purchase one particular version, both, or none. The …rm then releases only H, or both H and L simultaneously. The following proposition describes the optimal strategy. Proposition 1. The …rm's optimal segmentation strategy is as follows:
When 2=3 < s 1, it o¤ ers the product line H at a price p H = u H =2 (no versioning).
Proof. See the Appendix.
As already anticipated, for s = 1, our model corresponds to the standard case of information goods analyzed by the previous literature, e.g., by Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) . Indeed, when the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently high (s > 2=3), the cannibalization e¤ect of introducing the lower quality variant always prevails over the market expansion e¤ect, and the monopolist is better o¤ by supplying only H. When the level of substitutability is low, however, the …rm …nds it pro…table to o¤er both variants, and consumers self select the variant(s) that maximize their individual utility. The product line that emerges is L=H=B, where this notation means that consumers with a very low buy nothing, those with a low buy only L, those with an intermediate buy H, and those with a high buy both versions, B (Figure 1 ). This segmentation disappears if products are completely independent (s = 0), in which case it is optimal to sell both versions to every buyer.
The result that market segmentation is sustainable as long as consumers are able to buy both versions and the degree of substitutability is not too high is novel in the literature. Finally, note that the commercial strategy of the …rm will be more intricate but conceptually similar when the …rm has a positive marginal cost of supplying each version. In the Appendix we show in greater detail the …rm's optimal segmentation decision when the products o¤ered are not pure information goods. 
Sequential release
We now examine the case where the movie producer is not constrained to selling both products simultaneously, but can introduce the versions sequentially. Imagine that H is o¤ered in the …rst period and L can be released simultaneously or at a later time. With this extension we are stipulating two dimensions of product substitutability: one is exogenous and is represented by s, and the other is endogenous and is created by delaying the introduction of L. In particular, we study if di¤erences in the discount factors of consumers and the producer might a¤ect the commercialization strategy and the sequential release of the two versions.
Imagine that the …rm releases H at time t 0 and L at a possibly later time t 1 . We denote by d the compound discount factor for t 1 , so that choosing d implicitly determines the time t 1 when L is released. In particular, the period of time that elapses between t 0 and t 1 can be obtained from d = t p , where p is the producer's discount factor and t = t 1 t 0 is the video window that separates the release of the two versions. If t 0 = t 1 , then d = 1 and H and L are supplied simultaneously. If t 0 < t 1 then d < 1 and L is introduced some time after H. The lower the value of d, the later the release of L. The case of the release of H alone corresponds to the case of in…nite delay of L, that is, d = 0:
We also account for possible di¤erences in the discount factor of the producer and of the viewers. We de…ne the consumer's discount factor as c = x p , where 0 x 1 measures the consumer's relative impatience with respect to the …rm. Hence, we can write the consumer's compound discount factor as
Consumer's utility function (1) is immediately generalized to:
The expressions for the indi¤erent types are the same as before, with the exception of
which is the consumer that is indi¤erent between buying separately either H at t 0 or L at t 1 .
With the possibility of sequential release, the producer's strategy depends crucially on its ability to commit to the prices and the video window announced in the …rst period. We begin our analysis considering the case where it can credibly commit to its subsequent policy and viewers form correct expectations about it. The case of commitment seems particularly appropriate in the movie industry where the prices for both movie tickets and DVDs are stable over relatively long periods of time and can therefore be seen as long-term choice variables. This can occur, for example, when the …rm has built in the past a strong reputation on how it will introduce the products to the market, or when it designs expensive marketing campaigns that are costly to modify. Subsequently we will also analyze the case without commitment.
The timing of the game is thus the following: at time t 0 , the producer sets the retail prices p H and p L and also chooses the time t 1 t 0 in which L will be released. At time t 0 it then releases H, and at time t 1 it releases L. The following proposition shows the …rm's optimal versioning and sequencing strategy when 0 s 1.
Proposition 2.
Imagine that the …rm commits to its pricing and sequencing strategy. 1) If c = p = 1 sequencing never arises and products are o¤ ered as in Proposition 1.
c the …rm's optimal sequencing strategy is as follows:
When s = 1, the …rm supplies only H immediately (no versioning); Proof. See the Appendix.
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The …rst part of the proposition shows that when the producer's and the viewers'discount factors do not di¤er (x = 1) the …rm never introduces the products sequentially, because the loss generated by the postponement of pro…ts of L does not compensate the reduction in the cannibalization over H (see panel A of Figure 2 ). More precisely, when screening among customers, the compound discount factor d a¤ects only the decision of LH . However, by deferring the introduction of the low-quality version the …rm's pro…ts are negatively a¤ected, not only from those who indeed buy the low quality version alone in the second period, but also from those who buy one version in each period. This e¤ect always prevails and sequencing never occurs. As in Proposition 1, when s is high enough, only H is released, otherwise there is versioning.
The second and the third parts of the proposition present the case where consumers are relatively more impatient than the …rm (x < 1). The …rm supplies H alone in the …rst period only in the limiting case where s = 1 (H and B are perfect substitutes) That is, when the consumption of the second version does not confer any additional utility to consumers, the …rm does not release L, not even some time after the introduction of H. For s < 1 the strategy of the …rm depends on the ratio x = c = p : Panel B of Figure 2 shows that, for x > x c , 14 when s is low enough (0 < s ŝ c 1 ), still there is no sequencing, and both versions are released simultaneously. The two goods are rather independent, and the …rm releases them instantaneously as there is no gain in waiting until later. Forŝ c 1 < s < 1; however, there is now both versioning and sequencing. A low segment of consumers only buys L in the second period, an intermediate segment of consumers only buys H in the …rst period, and a high segment of consumers buys both goods sequentially. The screening problem with a video window becomes more pro…table with impatient customers: especially those with an intermediate willingness to pay prefer to buy H immediately instead of waiting for the delayed release of L: As we formally show in the proof, note thatŝ , there is an intermediate region where the …rm o¤ers the product line L=B and the versions are released sequentially. In this case, the …rm …nds it optimal to set prices such that all consumers who bought H in the …rst period also buy L later.
The previous case considered versioning when the producer is able to commit to its future pricing and sequencing policies. In some instances, however, the announcements made by the …rm may not be credible for customers. For example, producers could adjust the price of the video version if the movie turned out to be a success in the box-o¢ ce or if it won a prize in a …lm festival. Taking this into account, we follow Moorthy and Png (1992) and analyze next the producer's sequencing strategy when it cannot commit to the price of L at t 0 , which is instead set only at its release date. We assume again that consumers anticipate the future sales policy of the …rm and that the …rm is aware of the consumers'expectations.
The timing of this new game is as follows: At time t 0 the producer sets the retail price p H and releases it, and it also decides the time t 1 at which version L will be released; at time t 1 it sets p L and releases L. The following proposition shows our results. 2) If 1 > c = p = x > x nc the …rm's optimal sequencing strategy is:
When s = 1, the …rm supplies only H immediately (no versioning); Whenŝ nc < s < 1, the …rm o¤ ers the product line L=H=B and 0 < d < 1 (sequencing);
When s nc 1 < s ŝ nc , the …rm o¤ ers the product line L=H=B and d = 1 (versioning); When 0 < s s nc 1 , the …rm o¤ ers the product line L=B and d = 1 (versioning).
3) If 0 < c = p = x < x nc the …rm's optimal sequencing strategy is:
As in the commitment case, the …rst part of the proposition shows that the …rm never introduces the products sequentially when the consumers and the producer have the same discount factor (Panel A in Figure 3) . Now, however, the …rm will introduce versioning less often than in the commitment case, because s nc 1 < 2=3. As the …rm sets the price of p L at t 1 instead of t 0 ; it …xes it too low, which therefore might induce some customers (that are as patient as the …rm) to wait for the release of L. As the …rm cannot commit to a higher price of L initially, for a wider range of values of s it prefers not to release L at all.
Notice that the impossibility of commitment for the price of L also a¤ects the case when it results d = 1: while both versions are consumed at the same time, there is still a di¤erence in the order of the moves between the commitment and the no commitment case. While in the …rst case the prices of both versions are set simultaneously and prior to purchasing decisions, in the no commitment case the …rm …rst sets the price of H (and customers might buy it), and immediately after it sets the price of L (and customers might buy it). This explains why, for identical discount factors and d = 1 the …rm follows di¤erent strategies with commitment and no commitment. In particular, with no commitment the product line L=B can emerge (the …rm sells version L to all customers that have already bought H). Instead, under commitment, this strategy is never optimal as the …rm would …nd it pro…table to increase the price of L by a bit, making the more segmented product line L=H=B emerge.
The rest of the proposition considers the case where consumers are more impatient than the …rm (x < 1). Only when s = 1 does the …rm o¤er H exclusively during the …rst period. As in the commitment case, the existence and the size of the regions depends on the value of the ratio x = c = p . While the case of identical discount factors shows that there is less versioning without commitment, when x < 1; if the seller cannot pre-commit it will use longer video windows and there will be more sequencing. Our results thus complete those of Moorthy and Png (1992) , who show that, for s = 1; sequencing is less likely with no commitment. It is important to recall the di¤erences between our models. In their model with single purchase, versioning happens because of the convex cost function they employ. In our model with pure information goods, versioning happens thanks to the multi-purchase assumption as long as the versions are imperfect substitutes, but would not arise when s = 1: Our models also di¤er in the sequencing analysis, as in Moorthy and Png (1992) the …rm is constrained to release the versions only at two possible dates (in our notation, t 1 t 0 = t = 1), while we considered that the video length is endogenous and could take any value. This is why we …nd that sequencing is more likely in the no commitment case, because the …rm is able to better …ne-tune the release of L with an appropriate window.
To sum up, our results show that when the consumers'discount factor is lower than the producer's, it is optimal to introduce the versions sequentially if the degree of substitution between the versions is su¢ ciently large. This applies to pure information goods such as movies, without any reproduction cost. However, we believe it is di¢ cult to validate this rationale empirically in the movie industry, as it is hard to calculate the relative degree of patience of producers and viewers. 16 If instead one took the more neutral view that discount factors were the same, then sequencing would never emerge in our model. In addition, we have found that 'day-and-date'release strategies should be preferred under a wider range of circumstances when versioning is optimal. Therefore, our basic model still does not o¤er a complete reason for why, in practice, DVDs are often released sequentially. We propose next a new and simple reason for sequencing which relies on the vertical structure of the industry.
Sequential distribution of movies in a vertically-separated industry
This section focuses on the case where the versions of a product can be released through separated distribution "channels". We show that when the downstream sales channels are controlled by independent …rms, the incentives for versioning change and, crucially, sequencing can appear in situations that would otherwise not be contemplated by a fully integrated monopolist. To address this more complex situation, imagine there is a producer (a studio), an exhibitor (a movie theater), and a distributor (a DVD store). The producer holds all the rights over the movie but needs to release it in theaters and/or through DVD stores. The studio bargains wholesale payments with each channel, and afterwards the channels set the price of the versions they control, i.e., the theatre exhibitor sets the price of H and the distributor sets the price of L.
Our bargaining assumption contrasts with alternative models of vertical chains where one of the parties (typically the upstream producer) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other parties. This ‡exible bargaining approach o¤ers the same results that a take-it-or-leave-it model when all the bargaining power rests with one particular party. Moreover, bargaining illustrates well how the video window is usually determined in the movie industry. Indeed, although producers design the overall commercialization strategy for movies and have control over the DVD time release, exhibitors decide when to schedule the movie in the theater and the number of weeks that it will stay on screen. Therefore, both the producer and the exhibitor play a key role in determining the length of the video window.
In order to re ‡ect the situation of the U.S. movie industry after the Paramount decision in 1948, we …rst model the case where the producer is vertically separated from every downstream channel. The producer cannot fully appropriate the revenues associated with each version and the commercialization interests of the producer, the exhibitor and the video distributor are not perfectly aligned. At the end of this section, we also present the case where the producer directly sells the DVD versions (or o¤ers directly the movies on streaming), as this is a situation that can be of material relevance in the movie industry.
Negotiations between the producer and two independent distribution channels
Following the notation of Section 3, we call H the movie exhibited in theaters (high quality version) and L the movie viewed on DVD (low quality version). We stipulate that the prices H and L are set independently by the exhibitor and distributor, respectively. Moreover, the producer conducts two separate wholesale bargains, …rst with the exhibitor and then with the video distributor. The producer bargains with the exhibitor over both the rental price of the theatrical version (a) and the release time of the video version (t 1 ). It also separately bargains with the distributor over a revenue sharing agreement of video sales (r). These speci…cations and the vertical separation of the market generate a double markup distortion for the theatrical version and incentive misalignments about the video window among …rms. We next describe the game that is played between the producer and the channels. We denote by t 0 the earliest possible date to show any version of the movie. Prior to this date, the timing of the negotiations is as follows (see Figure 4) : First, at time t 2 the producer and the exhibitor jointly decide whether or not to show the movie in the theatre (version H). If negotiations break down, then H is not shown, the exhibitor gets nothing, and the producer still has the option of negotiating at time t 1 with the distributor the release of L and obtaining a share of the video sales. If instead the two parties agree to show H, they negotiate over the rental price a that must accrue to the producer and the release time t 1 t 0 for the video version. We model bargaining using the generalized Nash axiomatic approach, whereas the two negotiating players maximize the weighted product of the payo¤s received by the players in excess of their disagreement payo¤s. We denote by the degree of bargaining power of the producer in this negotiation and by 1 the degree of bargaining power of the exhibitor.
Second, at time t 1 the producer and the video distributor jointly decide the revenue share r accruing to the producer from DVD sales and the share 1 r kept by the distributor. In this negotiation is the producer's degree of bargaining power and 1 the distributor's. 18 If at time t 2 an agreement with the exhibitor had been reached, then DVD sales can occur at t 1 t 0 . 19 If instead past negotiations with the exhibitor had failed, the distributor and the producer could commercialize the DVD at the earliest possible date, i.e., t 0 : In either case, if the negotiation with the distributor breaks down, the distributor gets nothing while the producer might still get its rental price from each movie ticket that is sold in the theaters, in case negotiations at t 2 had succeeded. 20 Finally, after these contractual terms over a, d, and r are set, at time t 0 the exhibitor and the distributor independently set the retail prices p H and p L respectively.
The exhibitor then releases H at time t 0 and the distributor o¤ers L at t 1 . As in Section 3, we denote as d the compound discount factor for t 1 ; so that choosing d implicitly also determines t 1 . We assume that d is common to all …rms and consumers. Hence, taking into account the results of the previous section, in this setting we would never …nd sequencing under full integration.
The next proposition presents the equilibrium strategies for the …rms. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we show the results for the extreme cases where s = 0 (independent products) and s = 1 (standard case of single-unit purchase).
Proposition 4.
Imagine that the producer negotiates independently with the exhibitor and the distributor. 1) When s = 0 the product line o¤ ered by the producer is L=B and d = 1 (versioning and immediate release). The negotiated wholesale contracts specify a = u H 2 and r = . 1 8 In general, and will di¤er as the negotiating environments with the two channel will di¤er too. Some of the factors that a¤ect the negotiation between the parties include the presence of other channels in the region, the a¢ liation to an association of exhibitors, or the degree of patience of the players during negotiations. 1 9 The "video" window we consider implies that L is sold after H. In principle, one could also analyze an alternative timing where L is released …rst, and then H. However, it is easy to show that in our model a "movie" window never occurs under this alternative timing, as H is always introduced together with L.
2 0 For simplicity, we do not consider explicitly in this paper competition from alternative movies of other producers. This approach is justi…ed by the fact that the producer has a "unique" title/product which comes in two versions. If the exhibitor or the distributor could also sell the movies of other producers, their outside options would not be zero. where the threshold levels satisfy 0 < 1 .
The negotiated wholesale contracts specify a revenue share to the producer r = +
Proof : See the Appendix.
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The proposition shows that, when there is separation between the producer and the distribution channels, the results regarding versioning and sequencing change quite dramatically. Recall from Proposition 1 that, if an integrated monopolist fully controls the commercialization of the two versions, it o¤ers B when s = 0 and it introduces only H when s = 1 (the DVD version is delayed inde…nitely). However, with channel separation, these strategies are no longer sustainable.
When s = 0, versions H and L are independent and there is no cannibalization when the producer commercializes L at t 0 . As a result, sequencing is never pro…table and a "dayand-date" strategy emerges. The producer ends up selling the product line L=B, instead of the product line B that we found in Proposition 1, because the price p H is particularly high due to the double markup imposed by the producer and the exhibitor. Hence, customers with intermediate willingness to pay now buy only the L version. Finally, at the wholesale level, the rental price rises both with the quality of H and with the distributor's relative bargaining power, . Similarly, the greater the producer's bargaining power relative to the distributor's, the greater his revenue share from DVD sales.
The solution for s = 0 is rather intuitive, given the absence of strategic interaction between the two versions. The bargaining problem becomes considerably more involved when s = 1. Several equilibrium releasing strategies are now possible for the theatre and DVD versions. One or both versions might be released, and the two versions might be introduced simultaneously or sequentially. The reason for this is that now the …rms have di¤erent preferences over the introduction of version L, once H is released at time t 0 . The theatre exhibitor obtains more pro…ts by delaying the introduction of L, as this reduces the cannibalization of L over H. The distributor seeks just the opposite. And the producer considers the joint maximization of its pro…ts in the two channels and conducts the negotiations taking into account the bargaining power of its counterparts. 22 The proposition shows that, depending on the relative bargaining power of the …rms, three di¤erent segmentation strategies can appear. In order to clarify the exposition of the results, Figure 5 plots the range of validity of these regions when s = 1. Figure 6 instead plots the equilibrium value of the video window.
When is low enough ( < 0 ) there is a region where only H is released and therefore versioning does not arise. This corresponds to the case where the exhibitor is a tough negotiator and manages to delay the introduction of the video version inde…nitely. This pattern disappears as soon as the producer's bargaining power vis-à-vis the exhibitor ( ) and/or vis-à-vis the distributor ( ) increases. In this situation, if is not too high (
the versions are released sequentially, with a video window. However, for large values of ( > 1 ) we can get the striking result that the producer, in complete contrast with the exhibitor, will impose a "day-and-date" strategy and release the two version simultaneously. Note that the size of these three regions is a¤ected by the quality ratio k = u H =u L . Since @ 0 =@k > 0, it is more likely that only H is introduced when the quality of H is far superior to L (as long as < 0 ). Also, as @ 1 =@k < 0; the region with sequencing where 0 < < 1 becomes smaller and smaller the higher the quality of H relative to L. Finally, it is more likely that both versions are introduced simultaneously for high values of k (as long as > 1 ).
Notice in particular how, for very high values of k, we can have "bang-bang"solutions almost abruptly: a small (but discrete) increase in can bring the solution from d = 0 to d = 1 (consider for example the case where k = 20 in Figure 6 ). We remark that, in order to obtain sequencing, we need quite crucially both the vertical structure and incomplete contracts. Intuitively, because of the double marginalization over H, the producer can not fully internalize the pro…ts by selling just one version and it opts for versioning even when s = 1. Moreover, as it obtains part of the revenues generated from L, the producer may be interested in not delaying too much the release of this version (this interest increases the higher is ). Instead, the exhibitor only sells H and tries to delay as much as possible the introduction of L to reduce the cannibalization of this product. The exhibitor also has to make sure that the producer will not walk away from negotiations and release only L. This outside option is particularly relevant when k is not large, which tilts the choice in favor of versioning (see again Figure 5 ). The product line that ultimately emerges is determined by the relative degree of bargaining power of the various parties, as well as by the quality ratio of the two versions.
Another interesting result of the proposition is that versioning (either with immediate or staggered release of the two versions) becomes more likely the higher is . With a high value of the producer, being 'in between'the two channels, is better placed to internalize the cannibalization that L exerts over H, which should lead to no versioning when s = 1. However, the producer is still attracted to versioning for two reasons. First, a high value of means that the producer directly gets more from DVD sales, making a versioning strategy more appealing. Second, the producer has also an indirect strategic reason for versioning. In fact, with versioning, the outside option from DVD sales becomes a valuable threat when negotiating with the exhibitor, allowing the producer to secure a better rental charge from H. Conversely, if the producer obtains a higher rental charge from H, this also increases its outside option when negotiating with the distributor, as there is a complementarity between the outside options. This strategic e¤ect also explains why the revenue share obtained by the producer from the DVD version is strictly higher than its bargaining ability, r > , in contrast with the case where s = 0 where strategic e¤ects are absent and hence r = .
Finally, note that, even if is very high and the producer appropriates most of the revenues generated by L, the pricing decision of L is still taken by the independent distributor, not by the producer. In other words, even for = 1, the price of the DVD is still set too "aggressively"by the independent distributor that has no incentive to internalize its impact on the sales of H. This raises the question of whether there would be more or less versioning if the producer were able to sell the L version directly. In the movie industry, the separation between the studios and theater chains was dictated by an antitrust provision, but the distribution arrangements of DVD sales have been traditionally more varied. The situation analyzed so far corresponds to the situation where the distributor is independent from the producer. However, quite frequently the producers sell directly the DVD version via their websites or specialized stores. We next analyze the e¤ects of this alternative market con…guration.
Negotiations between an integrated producer and the exhibitor
We now consider the situation where the producer can sell directly the L version, but still needs to strike an agreement with the exhibitor to show the movie in a theatre. There is thus only one negotiation between the exhibitor and the producer at time t 1 , while at time t 0 the exhibitor and the producer take the retail price decisions over H and L, respectively. The next proposition presents the results for this market structure. Proof : See the Appendix.
The result for s = 0 is the same as Proposition 4. Not surprisingly, when versions are independent there is no cannibalization or strategic e¤ects arising from the two versions. The case where s = 1 is instead more interesting. Similar to Proposition 4, if the bargaining power of the producer is high enough, the producer segments the market and o¤ers the product line L=H. In spite of having integrated the L channel, the producer still cannot fully internalize the pro…ts by selling just H due to the double marginalization over H. Hence, it uses the rental price charged to the theatre exhibitor to extract part of its revenues and, in addition, it directly o¤ers L. The greater the bargaining power enjoyed by the producer, the higher the rental price that is eventually set.
What is remarkable from this case, compared to the full channel separation of Proposition 4, is that the producer will be more likely (i.e., for a wider range of values of ) introduce the DVD version and reduce the length of the video window. The main reason is that an independent distributor would set the price for the DVD too low, even when = 1 and the producer gets all the pro…ts of the video distribution. By contrast, when the producer is integrated with the video distributor, it sets the price of L and can better internalize the e¤ects from video sales on the theater side. This implies that the region where only H is released is smaller with integration ( 0 >^ 0 ) while the DVD version is introduced more often. Similarly, versioning with relatively short windows is obtained by the producer more often when it negotiates with the exhibitor, making it more likely that immediate release arises ( 1 >^ 1 ).
Conclusions
We have presented a model of movie distribution and consumption across two channels, which provides insights on how studios should time the window between theatrical and video releases. The main result is that a vertically integrated producer should release several versions of a movie in di¤erent channels when consumers are able to buy both versions of the product. The key parameter for this …nding is the degree of substitutability between the versions. Taking this into account, when planning their distribution strategy studio managers should determine the extent to which theatrical and non-theatrical consumer segments overlap. If DVDs deter people from going to the theater, then versioning should be less likely. However, if consumers enjoy consuming the same information goods or cultural products several times and through di¤erent channels, then day-and-date release should occur more often than previously thought by the literature. Indeed, some consumers would consider theatrical movies and DVDs partial substitutes, or even complements, because the utility they derive from consumption is not lost with each repetition, or because consumption of di¤erent versions enable them to appreciate di¤erent aspects of the movie. The vertical structure of the supply chain is at the core of the second contribution of our paper. We characterized equilibrium outcomes when the organizational structure of the industry is accounted for. In a vertically separated movie industry, the producer should agree to supply the two versions if the quality di¤erential between them is not too high, even when the two versions are perfect substitutes. In addition, if the producer's bargaining power is su¢ ciently low, versions will be introduced sequentially. In this case, intertemporal movie distribution can occur to a large extent because of ine¢ cient vertical contracting.
The possibility of delaying the introduction of a version still raises many questions both at a theoretical and at an empirical level. Waterman et al. (2010) found that the video window was quite stable (established at around 6 months) between 1988 and 1997, however it has since fallen steadily to a current window of about 4 months. Our model predicts this trend, either when markets are not subject to cannibalization or when distributors have a stronger bargaining power than that of the exhibitors when deciding on the length of the video window. Luan and Sudhir (2007) calculate that the optimal window should be even shorter, at around 2.5 months. Their approach, though, considers the pro…ts of an integrated producer/exhibitor, while we suggest that vertical separation might be one reason for longer video windows. Therefore, features of the vertical chain should be accounted for in future empirical studies or in numerical computations aimed at calibrating the optimal time release of di¤erent versions.
Despite our contributions to the literature, several relevant aspects for the movie industry have not been considered in full by this paper but could warrant interesting extensions aimed at increasing our understanding about the future of this industry. Piracy is an important problem that could be analyzed using our simple framework. Pirate copies are themselves a di¤erent variant (Sundararajan, 2004b) . They should be a very close substitute of DVDs, but a very poor substitute for the theatrical experience. In this paper, we also focused our attention on the optimal release for a single movie title supplied by a single studio, although versions may be distributed by di¤erent …rms. We foresee the introduction of competition among content producers as an essential issue for our future research. 24 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. When the …rm only o¤ers H, it sets the price p H that maximizes H = p H (1 H0 ), i.e., p H = u H =2 and the …rm obtains H = u H =4. Next, consider the case where the …rm o¤ers L to the low segment of consumers, H to the intermediate segment, and L and H to the high segment. It then sets p H and p L to maximize:
Solving this problem, we obtain the following prices and corresponding …rm's pro…ts:
It is simple to verify that H < LHB for s < 2=3. In this range, it is also straightforward to con…rm that at the equilibrium prices,
2 s : Imagine now that the …rm is able to bundle together the two products. In this case, the …rm's problem is to set the price p B that maximizes B = p B (1 B0 ). Solving this problem we obtain that the optimal price is p B = (u H + u L (1 s))=2 and the …rm's pro…ts are B = (u H + u L (1 s))=4. Finally, observe that B > LHB and B > H for any value of s. Thus, if feasible, the …rm would bundle the two versions together. Q.E.D.
The following proposition generalizes the results to the case where c 0 and 1 s 1. When s < 0, the two variants of the product are complements. Although this possibility can be quite exceptional in the movie industry, it is more common for other information goods such as music, where consumers obtain more utility from a concert if they have previously listened to the same music in a CD.
Generalization of Proposition 1. Imagine c 0. The optimal segmentation strategy and the pro…t maximizing prices depend on the degree of substitution s between versions: When s 1 < s 1, the …rm supplies only the H version at a price p H = (c + u H )=2;
When s 2 < s s 1 , the …rm supplies the product line L=H=B at prices
Whenŝ < s s 2 , the …rm supplies the product line H=B at prices
When s 3 < s ŝ, the …rm supplies the product line H=B at prices
When s s 3 , the …rm supplies the product line
where the cut-o¤ points are
Proof of the Generalization of Proposition 1. Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, the …rm's expression for the pro…t when it only o¤ers H and c > 0 is H = (p H c)(1 H0 ). Maximizing this with respect to the price we obtain p H = (c + u H )=2 and the corresponding pro…t H = (u H c) 2 =(4u H ). Consumers between H0 = 1=2+c=(2u H ) and 1 buy only H, and the others buy nothing. When the …rm o¤ers the pattern L=H=B, the prices and the associated pro…ts are:
It can be computed that the value of s that equals H and LHB is 
, at the prices given by (5) it is L0 = H0 = LH . Therefore, for s 2 < s s 1 there is a region B where the product line L=H=B is o¤ered. For s < s 2 , the …rst marginal buyers will choose H instead of L, since now H0 < L0 , and no one buys L alone. When this occurs, the …rm will choose p H and p L to maximize:
The prices and the associated pro…t would be:
In this region, which we shall call C, the product line is H=B and the indi¤erent types are
. This solution holds as long as HB H0 , which 26 results in s s
Notice, however, that we also have to check that consumers may not want to buy L: L0 u L p L 0 at the prices given by (7). This is satis…ed when s ŝ = c(1=u L 1=u H ) < s 2 , and (7) is the solution for s 3 s ŝ: Whenŝ s s 2 , we are still in region C as the product line is H=B, but the prices take a di¤erent expression. In particular, the …rm sets p L = p H (u L =u H ) in order to make sure that L0 = LH . The prices that satisfy this condition and maximize the pro…t in (7) are:
In this case the indi¤erent types are HB =
,
. This is region D. Proof of Proposition 2. We …rst consider the case where x = 1, which implies that d c = d. Imagine that the …rm releases the two versions sequentially: it o¤ers H at t 0 to the intermediate and the high segment of consumers, and L at t 1 to the low and high segment of consumers. It then maximizes the following pro…t:
The prices that solve this problem and the corresponding pro…ts are:
Next, in order to determine the …rm's sequencing policy, note that
4(2 s)
. This implies that, for s 2=3; the …rm optimally sets d = 1 and there is simultaneous release. For s > 2=3; the …rm sets d = 0 and o¤ers H alone at t 0 , with a resulting pro…t of H = u H =4, as in Proposition 1.
The second part of the proposition analyzes the case where x < 1 and d c = x t d: When the …rm releases the products sequentially, it maximizes the pro…t as in (9) . The optimal prices and the associated pro…ts are now:
The next step is to analyze how the …rm establishes the video window. The analytical solution is rather complex, but we can easily establish limiting cases. First note that, from d = t p , it follows that t = Log(d)=Log( p ). Next, by evaluating the FOC with respect to d at d = 1 we obtain:
The sign of this expression is positive for s <ŝ 
which is never negative, unless s = 1. Thus, the …rm sets d = 0 and o¤ers H alone only in the limiting case where s = 1, while in all other cases with s < 1 it always sets d > 0. Finally, it can be seen immediately thatŝ 1 gets smaller as x is low (customers are relatively more patient) or p is high (the …rm does not discount much the future). Therefore, forŝ c 1 < s < 1; the prices in (11) are a candidate solution, as long as the ranking of indi¤erent types follows HB > LH > L0 : In this region the indi¤erent types are:
It is always LH > L0 : Also, if d = 1, it is always HB > LH : More in general, in the fs; dg space, the condition HB > LH is always satis…ed by the candidate solution obtained from @ SEQ LHB =@d = 0 as long as x is higher than a limiting value, denoted as x c . For lower values of x, however, the ranking cannot be preserved. Consider therefore the condition such that HB = LH which gives
The limiting value x c is obtained by looking at the …rst point of tangency between the curve that describes @ SEQ LHB =@d = 0 and the curve that describes (12) . After computations, it is the highest value of x such that the equation
can have a root in the plausible domain 0 < d < 1; 0 < x < 1: When x < x c , it can be shown that the curve that describes @ SEQ LHB =@d = 0 intersects the curve (12) twice in the the fs; dg space: call these roots (s ; the second marginal buyer will buy B instead of H, and no consumer buys H alone. Thus, the …rm o¤ers the product line L=B and sets p L = (1 s)p H k dsx t to make sure that HB = LH . In particular, the …rm now maximizes:
The prices and the associated pro…ts are:
With these prices, the indi¤erent types are LB = Proof of Proposition 3. Imagine that the …rm does not commit to the price of L. If it releases the two versions sequentially, at t 1 it can sell L to consumers with a low that have bought nothing in the …rst period, and to consumers with a high that have already bought
. The analysis at the second stage is independent of the particular value taken by x since in the expressions that de…ne the market shares there is no discounting. Also notice that, at time t 1 ; LH should be taken as given, as its value is determined at t 0 :
When there is an interior solution that preserves the ranking HB LH L0 the …rm o¤ers the product line L=H=B and sets the price
. At t 0 , it o¤ers H and sets p H and d to maximize the following pro…t:
where p L is the price de…ned at
. After solving the problem we obtain that the optimal prices determined by the …rm and the associated pro…ts are:
;
The …rst part of the proposition considers the simpler case of identical discount factors, x = 1: This simpli…es the above pro…t function as follows:
This expression is strictly convex in d. Hence the solution is either at d = 0 (i.e., only H is sold)
. The latter is preferred as long as
Notice that s nc is equal to 2=3 only in the limiting case when k tends to 1, otherwise it is strictly lower than 2/3 as it decreases in k, reaching a limit of 7=11 for k ! 1. Prices in (15) 1 the second marginal buyer will buy B instead of H, since now HB < LH , and no consumer buys H alone. In this range, the …rm has two options: It can set the price p L such that either HB = LH (the product line L=B emerges), or that L0 = LH (the product line H=B emerges). The former is the most pro…table strategy, hence the …rm sets p L = (1 s)u L LH : 24 This implies that in the second period the …rm caters to all the previous customers, plus a bit more on the lower 2 4 To be precise, this is true as long as LH > (1 s)=(3 3s + s 2 ) which is satis…ed at equilibrium.
end. With this pattern, at t 0 the …rm o¤ers H and sets p H and d to maximize: SEQ LB = (p H + dp L )(1 LB ) + dp L ( LB L0 ):
The optimal prices and the associated pro…ts are:
This pro…t function is again strictly convex in d. Hence the …rm's optimal sequencing strategy is either at
. The latter option is preferred by the …rm as long as s < s
. It is also s 
We callŝ nc the value of s such that
= 0 (we do not report the explicit value as this involves a long expression). The sign of this FOC is positive for s ŝ nc , hence the corner solution d = 1 (simultaneous release) can exist for 0 < s <ŝ nc . Forŝ nc < s < 1 there can exist an interior solution with 0 < d < 1 where the …rm releases H and L sequentially. Indeed, as with commitment, it is easily veri…ed that the FOC calculated for d = 0 is never negative for any value of x < 1, unless s = 1. This implies that forŝ nc < s < 1 the …rm o¤ers L=H=B and the prices in (15) are a candidate solution, as long as the indi¤erent types are ranked as HB > LH > L0 , where:
It is always LH > L0 . Solving HB = LH with respect to s we obtain: 
Notice that this gives the same price that would be o¤ered in the commitment case when x x c and the …rm o¤ers the L=B. Taking this into account, the …rm's optimal pro…ts are thus again as in (13) . The analysis with respect to d is also the same when there is an interior solution. The di¤erence with the commitment case is that now there can be a corner solution with d = 1 and a product line L=B. This is characterized by FOC with respect to d, when calculated at d = 1: Proof of Proposition 4. Imagine that s = 0 and the producer reaches wholesale agreements with the exhibitor and the distributor. If the producer o¤ers the product line L=B, at t 0 the exhibitor's retail problem is to set p H to maximize e LB = (p H a)(1 LB ) and the distributor's is to set p L to maximize d LB = (1 r)dp L (1 L0 ), where the indi¤erent types are LH = (p H dp L )=(u H du L ) and L0 = p L =u L . Computing the Nash equilibrium in prices and substituting them in the pro…ts yields:
As a consequence of these prices, the producer would get
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At time t 1 , the producer negotiates with the distributor over the revenue share r in a Nash bargain. Let 0 < < 1 be the producer's degree of bargaining power vis-à-vis the distributor. In case the negotiation breaks down, the distributor's outside option is zero, while the producer can still set an agreement with the exhibitor at t 2 to sell H, in which case it obtains a(1
). Thus the pair of …rms solve the following problem:
This gives the equilibrium share r = . Instead, in case negotiations with the exhibitor had previously broken down, the producer's outside option would be zero in the current negotiation with the distributor, and the revenue share, as well as the release date of L, would be determined from selling L alone, that is
from which we get again the result that r = since H and L are independent (s = 0), as well as d = 1: That is, if version H is not commercialized due to an earlier breakdown, the producer and the distributor release immediately L and share the monopoly pro…ts according to their relative degree of bargaining power. This result determines the value of the producer's outside option p L = u L =4 used in its negotiation with the exhibitor. At time t 2 , the producer and the exhibitor bargain to determine the length of the video window and the rental price a, where the outside option for the exhibitor is zero, while the outside option for the distributor amounts to p L , as just described. Let 0 < < 1 now denote the producer's degree of bargaining power vis-à-vis the exhibitor. The …rms solve the following Nash problem:
where r = is used into the expression (18) for p LB : First, notice that p LB overall depends positively on d, while e LB is independent of it. Thus d is set at its highest possible value, d = 1. Second, after solving the FOC with respect to the rental price we get a = u H =2.
The proof of the case where s = 1 follows the same reasoning, although the solution is now considerably more complex. If the producer o¤ers the product line L=H, at time t 0 the exhibitor sets p H to maximize e LH = (p H a)(1 LH ) and the distributor sets p L to maximize d LH = dp L ( LH L0 ). Solving these problems and substituting the prices in the pro…t functions yields:
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The producer thus would get
At time t 1 , the producer negotiates with the distributor over the revenue share for version L in a Nash bargain. They solve the following problem Notice that the producer's outside option is the same as for s = 0, as it corresponds to the case where H is sold monopolistically. This gives the revenue share:
where k = u H =u L > 1. Notice that the revenue share is r = 1 when = 1, but in all other cases it is r > , that is, the producer gets a revenue share in excess of its bargaining power (the square bracket in (20) is always positive to the extent that a is high enough, which will happen at equilibrium). The revenue share to the producer also increases in d.
In case negotiations with the exhibitor had previously broken down, the producer and the distributor release immediately version L (d = 1) and share the monopoly pro…ts according to their relative degree of bargaining power (r = ). This determines the producer's outside option p L = u L =4 used in its negotiation with the exhibitor at time t 2 . At t 2 , the length of the window and the rental price of H are determined from the following Nash bargain between the producer and the exhibitor: 
which, after substitutions, results in the following expression:
Equation (24) is of second degree in a, but has only one positive root and therefore can be easily solved to …nd the value a . Substituting a into (22) Figure 6 in the text for a plot of d at equilibrium.
We now discuss what happens when an interior solution does not exist for some parameter con…guration. Take …rst the corner solution d = 0, i.e., version L is not released. In this case, the rental price that maximizes ; A = q 9 10 + 9 2 :
Hence the corner solution d = 0 can occur as long as 0 takes plausible values (between 0 and 1). It can be shown that 0 is decreasing in , hence it takes its maximum value 0 = 1 for = 0.
0 is also increasing in k: In particular, when = 1, it reaches the limit 0 = 6 4 p 2 0:343 when k ! 1. Figure 5 reports a three-dimensional plot of 0 .
Consider now the corner solution d = 1 (both versions are released simultaneously). In this case, the rental price that maximizes it takes its maximum value 1 = 1 for = 0. 1 is also decreasing in k: In particular, when = 1, it reaches the limit value 1 = 6 4 p 2 0:343 when k ! 1. Since 0 is instead increasing in k and for = 1 it reaches a limit value for 0 = 6 4 p 2 when k ! 1 this imply that 1 > 0 for all parameters range. Figure 5 reports the three-dimensional plot of 1 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof for s = 0 is identical to Proposition 4, simply after substituting = 1. Consider now s = 1 and imagine …rms o¤er L=H. At time t 0 the exhibitor sets p H to maximize e LH = (p H a)(1 LH ) and the producer sets p L to maximize p LH = dp L ( LH L0 ) + a(1 LH ). Solving these problems yields:
Contract terms are established at time t 1 by maximizing the following expression: As in Proposition 4, assume …rst there is an interior solution with 0 < d < 1. Taking the ratio of the FOCs, yields again (23) which now simpli…es and, after substitutions, results in the following rental charge:
where d is the solution of the following equation, obtained after substituting (25) 
We do not report the explicit value for d as this involves a long expression, but Figure 8 below shows when the solution takes interior values.
We now consider what happens when there is the corner solution d = 1. In this case, the rental price that maximizes p;e LH is obtained only from (21) , which gives:
To de…ne the range of validity of this solution, substitute d = 1 into (26), to get 
